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Abstract
Monetary policy is analyzed in a simple model with credit market
imperfections, ﬂexible prices, and a ﬂoating exchange rate. Banks’
lending rates incorporate a premium, which depends on ﬁrms’ net
worth, over the cost of borrowing from the central bank. In contrast
to models in the Kiyotaki-Moore tradition, the supply of bank loans is
perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate. The central bank sets
the reﬁnance rate and provides banks with unlimited access to liquidity
at that rate. The model is used to study the macroeconomic eﬀects of
changes in the reﬁnance and reserve requirement rates, central bank
auctions, shifts in the risk premium and contract enforcement costs,
and changes in public spending and world interest rates.
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21 Introduction
Modern central banks conduct monetary policy mostly by setting a key short-
term nominal interest rate, which in turn (depending on the behavior of
lenders and borrowers) tends to aﬀect market-determined rates. Yet, except
for a few exceptions, textbook discussions continue to characterize monetary
policy as consisting of controlling some monetary aggregate, with the inter-
est rate adjusting freely to ﬂuctuations in the supply and demand for money.
The various open-economy extensions of the standard IS-LM model belong
to this tradition. Because these models mischaracterize the process through
which monetary policy is implemented, they not only have limited peda-
gogical value (despite their relative simplicity and tractability) but are also
potentially misleading when it comes to conducting policy analysis. More-
over, attempts to extend such models to account for interest rate setting by
monetary authorities have met with limited success, because of their failure
to account for the complexity of the monetary transmission mechanism–
most importantly, interactions between credit market frictions (which remain
pervasive in most countries), banks’ pricing behavior, and central bank reg-
ulations, in the determination of market interest rates.
In a recent paper, we proposed a simple static framework for monetary
policy analysis under ﬁxed exchasnge rates (Agénor and Montiel (2006)). A
key feature of the model is that it accounts for an important source of imper-
fection in credit markets, namely, the limited enforceability of loan contracts.
This is a particularly relevant consideration for developing countries, where
the ﬁnancial system is dominated by banks and weaknesses in the legal sys-
tem often make it diﬃcult for lenders to seize collateral in case of default.
Speciﬁcally, the source of credit market imperfections in the model is default
risk, which leads banks to charge a premium over and above the (marginal)
cost of funds, taking into account the rate of return on alternative assets.
In turn, the premium is taken to depend on borrowers’ net worth. At the
prevailing lending rate, the supply of loans is perfectly elastic and the actual
stock of credit is demand determined. Thus, unlike models in the tradition of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), or models along the lines proposed by Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000, 2004), or Cooley and Quadrini (2006), bor-
rowing from banks is not strictly constrained by the borrower’s initial wealth,
current cash ﬂow, or own equity.
This paper extends our previous framework in several directions. As
before, we continue to assume that prices are fully ﬂexible and that banks
3set lending rates as a markup over their marginal cost of funds. In turn,
the markup rate is a function of ﬁrms’ collateralizable net worth.1 Banks’
funding sources are perfect substitutes, and loan supply and the provision of
liquidity by the central bank are perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending
and reﬁnance rates. Changes in the price of a real asset (which we refer
to as land, but could alternatively represent housing) have liquidity and
wealth eﬀects, which stimulate private consumption. Private investment is
speciﬁed as a function of the real lending rate. The key diﬀerences are that
we now consider the case of a ﬂoating exchange rate economy (with possible
ad hoc central bank intervention), and that we analyze the more realistic
case where portfolio reallocations between domestic and foreign assets are
not instantaneous. Our view is in the spirit of Krugman (1999) and remains
the same as before: because of its relative simplicity, the model proposed
in this paper is a useful tool for basic monetary policy analysis. Its main
virtues are that its mechanics continue to be relatively straightforward, its
intuition can be conveyed easily, and it can be adapted to address a number
of issues beyond those discussed in the paper. Given that any economic
model is, almost by deﬁnition, an ad hoc simpliﬁcation, the ability to derive
policy prescriptions that can be conveyed in relatively clear language is a
particularly important consideration from the point of view of inﬂuencing the
way policymakers think about the transmission process of monetary policy.
From that perspective, and although the microeconomic foundations of our
framework were not fully derived (thereby preventing a rigorous evaluation
of welfare eﬀects), our analysis of various experiments suggests that it leads
to sensible policy lessons.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Because we retain essentially the same features as in our previous
work, our description is fairly condensed, except for those aspects of the
1The use of collateral itself, although unexplained in the model, could be related to stan-
dard adverse selection or moral hazard considerations, the nature of the lender-borrower
relationship, the degree of competition in the credit market, or the cost of screening bor-
rowers. Moreover, as discussed for instance by Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006), it
could also be viewed by borrowers themselves as a signal of credit quality.
2In addition, it should be noted that the predictions of micro-based optimizing models
are notoriously sensitive to a host of assumptions, such as the degree of (non) separability
in household preferences. Using linear approximations to general utility functions–as is
often done in the literature–may also create problems for evaluating the welfare properties
of these models. See VanHoose (2004) for a critical discussion of the New open-economy
macroeconomics along these lines.
4model that are speciﬁct ot h eﬂoating exchange rate version. Analytical and
graphical solutions are provided in Section 3. In Section 4 the model is used
to perform a set of experiments pertaining to changes in the reﬁnance and
reserve requirement rates, central bank auctions, shifts in the premium and
contract enforcement costs, as well as changes in public spending and in the
world interest rate. The last section oﬀe r ss o m ec o n c l u d i n gr e m a r k s .
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy producing a single (composite) good that is
imperfectly substitutable for a foreign good. The economy is small and the
world price of the foreign good is exogenous. Domestic output is ﬁxed within
the time frame of the analysis. There are six markets in the economy (for
currency, bank deposits, credit, bonds, goods, and foreign exchange), and
four categories of agents: households, commercial banks, the government,
and the central bank. The nominal exchange rate is ﬂexible, although the
central bank retains the discretion to intervene in the market for foreign
exchange.
2.1 Household Portfolio Allocation
Households consume both the domestic and foreign goods, and hold four
types of ﬁnancial assets: domestic currency (which bears no interest), domes-
tic currency-denominated deposits with commercial banks, foreign currency-
denominated deposits held abroad, and land, the supply of which is ﬁxed
and normalized to one. All assets are imperfect substitutes for each other,
and foreigners do not hold domestic assets.
Total household ﬁnancial wealth, AH,i sd e ﬁned as:
A
H = BILL+ D + Q · 1+E · D
∗, (1)
where BILL is currency holdings, D (D∗) domestic (foreign) bank deposits,
and Q the price of land. Because household ﬁnancial wealth depends on the
current-period values of the price of land and the exchange rate, it has both a
predetermined as well as an endogenous component. These can be expressed
as:
A
H =( BILL+ D + Q0 + E0 · D
∗)+( Q − Q0)+( E − E0)D
∗,
5that is, using (1),
A
H = A
H
0 +( Q − Q0)+( E − E0)D
∗
0, (2)
where Q0 and E0 are, respectively, the beginning-of-period values of the price
of land and the nominal exchange rate, and D∗
0 is the beginning-of-period
stock of foreign exchange deposits. The term AH
0 represents the predeter-
mined component of household ﬁnancial wealth and (Q−Q0)+(E −E0)D∗
0
is the endogenous component.
The allocation of household ﬁnancial wealth is described as follows. First,
the demand for currency is assumed to be related negatively to the opportu-
nity cost of holding cash, as measured by the interest rate on the alternative
transactions medium, bank deposits:
BILL
D
= ν(iD), (3)
where iD is the interest rate on bank deposits and ν0 < 0.3
The real demand for domestic-currency deposits, in turn, is taken to
depend positively on the exogenous level of output, ¯ Y , and the bank deposit
rate, as well as negatively on the rate of return on alternative assets, that
is, the domestic-currency rate of return on foreign deposits and the expected
rate of increase in the price of land, ˆ q:
D
P
= d(iD,i
∗ + ε, ˆ q, ¯ Y ), (4)
where P is the cost-of-living index, i∗ the (risk-free) interest rate on deposits
held abroad, and ε the expected rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. The derivatives in this equation are such that d1, d4 > 0 and d2, d3 < 0.4
Using (3) and (4), we will assume that
ηD
ην
>
BILL
BILL+ D
=
ν
1+ν
, (5)
3The reason why only the interest rate iD enters in (3) is that currency is viewed only
as an alternative to holding domestic deposits and there is no direct return to holding
cash.
4Here and below, gi(·) represents the partial derivative of function gi(·) with respect to
its ith argument.
6where ηD = PdiDiD/D = diDiD/d > 0 and ην = −ν0iD/ν > 0. That is, the
ratio of the interest elasticity of demand for deposits to that of the currency-
deposit ratio exceeds the share of currency in the total money stock, given
by BILL/(BILL + D). When this condition is satisﬁed, an increase in
the deposit interest rate will increase the total demand for money (that is,
∂(BILL+ D)/∂iD > 0).
Turning to the nonmonetary assets, land and foreign-currency deposits
are taken to be imperfect substitutes. Accordingly, the household’s desired
allocation of its nonmonetary ﬁnancial wealth between the two assets depends
on their expected rates of return:
E · D∗
Q + E · D∗ = f(i
∗ + ε, ˆ q),
or,
E · D
∗ =
f(i∗ + ε, ˆ q)
1 − f(i∗ + ε, ˆ q)
Q = h(i
∗ + ε, ˆ q)Q, (6)
where f1 > 0, f2 < 0,a n dh = f/(1 − f),s oh1 > 0, h2 < 0.
We will assume, however, that households face costs in adjusting their
stocks of foreign-currency deposits. While these costs could be motivated in
a variety of ways, a simple assumption is that the country in question main-
tains (imperfect) restrictions over capital outﬂows, which have the eﬀect of
throwing “sand in the wheels” of the mechanism through which households
adjust their stocks of foreign-currency deposits. As a result, these adjust-
ments are not instantaneous. Speciﬁcally, we will assume that they occur
gradually over time, in such a way that capital outﬂows during each pe-
riod, denoted ∆D∗, are proportional to the gap between households’ desired
stock of foreign exchange deposits and the actual stock they inherit from the
previous period:
∆D
∗ = λ(D
∗ − D
∗
0),
that is, using (6),
∆D
∗ = λ[h(i
∗ + ε, ˆ q)Q/E − D
∗
0]. (7)
The parameter λ>0 is an indicator of the severity of adjustment costs,
with λ =1indicating the absence of such costs, and λ =0as i t u a t i o nw h e r e
such costs are prohibitive, eliminating private capital movements altogether.
Under these conditions, the eﬀective demand for foreign-currency deposits
becomes:
E · D
∗ = λh(i
∗ + ε, ˆ q)Q +( 1− λ)E · D
∗
0. (8)
7In turn, the eﬀective demand for land can be derived residually from
equation (1) as
Q = A
H − BILL− D − E · D
∗,
that is, using (3), (4), and (8),
Q = A
H
0 +(Q−Q0)+(E −E0)D
∗
0 −(1 +ν)Pd(·)−λh(·)Q−(1 −λ)E ·D
∗
0.
Rearranging terms yields
Q =
AH
0 − Q0 − [1 + ν(iD)]Pd(iD,i ∗ + ε, ˆ q, ¯ Y )+( λE − E0)D∗
0
λh(i∗ + ε, ˆ q)
,
or equivalently
Q = Q(iD,i
∗ + ε, ˆ q, ¯ Y,E;A
H
0 ). (9)
Because the supply of land is exogenous, this equation also represents
the equilibrium condition in the market for land. It therefore determines the
equilibrium value of Q. It has the following properties:
Q1 = −
Pdην(1 + ν)
iDλh
(
ηD
ην
−
ν
1+ν
) < 0,
Q2 = −
Qλh1 +( 1+ν)Pd2
λh
< 0,
Q3 = −
Qλh2 +( 1+ν)Pd3
λh
> 0,
Q4 = −
(1 + ν)Pd4
λh
< 0,
Q5 = D
∗
0/h > 0,
Q6 =1 /λh > 0.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h e s er e s u l t si sa sf o l l o w s . A ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e p o s i t
rate shifts households into money (bills and domestic bank deposits), with
no eﬀect on their choice between land and foreign deposits; it must therefore
result, other things equal, in a decline in their demand for land and a decrease
in the equilibrium price of land. An increase in the rate of return on foreign
deposits, by contrast, has two eﬀects on the demand for land: ﬁrst, by causing
the demand for money to contract, it increases demand for all non-monetary
assets, including land; second, it reduces the demand for land by causing
8households to switch from land into foreign-currency deposits. The net eﬀect
on the demand for land is thus ambiguous in principle. However, if land is a
closer substitute for foreign deposits than for money, the second eﬀect must
dominate. Because this assumption is plausible, we assign a negative sign to
Q2.
Next, an increase in the expected rate of increase in land prices unam-
biguously raises the demand for land, drawing resources out of both money
holdings and foreign-currency deposits. Thus, an expected future increase in
the price of land raises its current price. Higher domestic income, by contrast,
induces households to hold more money for transactions purposes, reducing
the demand for land as an asset and lowering its price. A depreciation of the
exchange rate creates a capital gain on foreign-currency deposits, which in-
creases household wealth and therefore also the demand for, and equilibrium
price of, land. The magnitude of this eﬀect depends on the initial composi-
tion of household portfolios. If households initially hold their desired ratio of
foreign-currency deposits to land, so that E0D∗
0/Q0 = h,t h e nQ5E0/Q0 =1 ,
that is, the equilibrium land price and the nominal exchange rate change in
the same proportion. Finally, an increase in initial household wealth raises
the demand for land, because in the absence of wealth eﬀects on the de-
mand for money, the additional resources are devoted to holding land and
foreign-currency deposits. The result is an increase in the equilibrium price
of land.
2.2 Commercial Banks
Banks allocate their investable assets (that is, assets net of required reserves)
between loans to ﬁrms and holdings of government bonds. They can borrow
reserves from the central bank in order to match their assets and liabilities,
but cannot borrow abroad. Banks’ assets therefore consist of credit extended
to ﬁrms, LF, reserves held at the central bank, RR,a n dg o v e r n m e n tb o n d s ,
BB, whereas their liabilities consist of deposits held by households, D,a n d
borrowing from the central bank, LB.5 Banks’ balance sheet can therefore
be written as:
L
F + RR + B
B = D + L
B. (10)
Reserves held at the central bank do not pay interest. They are deter-
5All these variables are measured in nominal terms.
9mined by:
RR = μD, (11)
where μ ∈ (0,1) is the reserve requirement ratio.
Banks set both deposit and lending rates. As noted earlier, from their
perspective domestic-currency deposits and central bank liquidity are per-
fect substitutes at the margin. Accordingly, the deposit rate on domestic-
currency deposits, iD, is set equal to the cost of funds provided by the central
bank, iR, with a downward correction that accounts for the (implicit) cost of
holding reserve requirements:
1+iD =( 1+iR)(1 − μ). (12)
Apart from the central bank, commercial banks are the only holders of
domestic government debt. The interest rate that banks demand to be paid
on government bonds, iB, is set as a premium over their marginal cost of
funds, which is given by the cost of borrowing from the central bank, iR:
1+iB =( 1+θB)(1 + iR), (13)
and θB is the risk premium on government bonds, which is assumed to be
increasing in the ratio of the stock of these bonds held by banks, BB,t ot h e
m a x i m u md e b tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sﬁscal plans can support, Bmax.T h u s :
θB = θB(B
B/B
max),θ
0
B > 0. (14)
The domestic loan rate is set at a premium over the prevailing interest
rate on government bonds:
1+iL =( 1+θL)(1 + iB), (15)
where the risk premium θL on lending to ﬁrms is inversely related to the ratio
of ﬁrms’ assets (the value of their beginning-of-period physical capital stock,
K0, which is taken as given, times PD, the price of the domestic good) over
their liabilities, which consist of beginning-of-period loans, LF
0 :
θL = θL(
κPDK0
LF
0
;xP), (16)
where xP is a shift parameter, whereas θL1 < 0 and θL2 > 0. The coef-
ﬁcient κ ∈ (0,1) in (16) measures the proportion of ﬁrms’ assets that can
10eﬀectively be used or pledged as collateral; κPDK0 therefore measures ﬁrms’
“collateralizable” wealth.6
Using equations (14), (15), and (16), the banks’ loan rate can be written
as:
iL =[ 1+θL(
κPDK0
LF
0
;xP)][1 + θB(B
B/B
max)](1 + iR) − 1,
or equivalently
iL = iL(PD;B
B,i R,x P,..), (17)
with iL1 < 0,i L2 > 0,i L3 > 0,and iL4 > 0. That is, the loan rate is de-
creasing in the domestic price level, because it raises the value of the ﬁrms’
collateralizable net worth; and it is increasing in the stock of bonds held by
banks (because that increases the interest rate on government bonds, which
provides the benchmark for pricing private debt). It is also increasing in the
marginal cost of funds to banks and in the shift parameter xP.
Because commercial banks are the only private holders of government
bonds, their total holdings are determined by central bank policies. Speciﬁ-
cally, banks’ holdings of government bonds are determined by the diﬀerence
between the total stock of bonds outstanding, ¯ B, which is predetermined,
and bonds held by the central bank, BC:
B
B = ¯ B − B
C. (18)
Given the commercial banks’ interest rate-setting behavior, the actual
stock of credit outstanding is determined by ﬁrms’ demand for loans, to be
described below. With BB, LF, RR and D being determined by either the
central bank or private agents, the balance sheet constraint (10) requires that
borrowing from the central bank be determined as
L
B = L
F + RR + B
B − D.
Using (4) and (11), this equation becomes:
L
B = L
F + B
B − (1 − μ)d(iD,i
∗ + ε, ˆ q, ¯ Y )P. (19)
6See Agénor and Montiel (2006) for a more detailed discussion. Although we treat κ
as constant, it is worth noting that in a more general setting it could be made counter-
cyclical, to reﬂect the fact that banks are more willing to lend when ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows
are high or, equivalently, that banks are prone to excessive lending during booms. Thus,
counter-cyclical movements in κ could also result from proyclical changes in the intensity
of competition among banks.
112.3 Central Bank
In addition to selling bonds to commercial banks, the central bank supplies
reserves elastically to them at the ﬁxed oﬃcial (or reﬁnance) rate, iR. Because
banks set their deposit rate on the basis of this oﬃcial rate, monetary policy
operates largely through the eﬀects of the reﬁnance rate on the banking
system’s cost of funds. And because the supply of liquidity is perfectly elastic
at rate iR, base money is endogenous. Although the exchange rate is ﬂexible,
we will also allow scope for the central bank to intervene in the foreign
exchange market on an ad hoc (or discretionary) basis.
The central bank’s balance sheet consists, on the asset side, of loans to
commercial banks, LB, foreign exchange reserves, R∗ (measured in foreign-
currency terms), and government bonds, BC. On the liability side, it consists
of the monetary base, MB, plus capital, which is comprised solely of capital
gains or losses on foreign exchange reserves arising from ﬂuctuations in the
market exchange rate relative to the reference rate, E0:
E · R
∗ +( B
C + L
B)=MB+( E − E0)R
∗. (20)
The monetary base is the sum of currency in circulation and required
reserves:
MB = BILL+ RR, (21)
which implies, using (11), that the supply of cash is
BILL
s = MB− μD. (22)
In this framework, the central bank can manipulate three instruments
to conduct monetary policy: the reﬁnance rate, iR, holdings of government
bonds, BC, and the required reserve ratio, μ. It also has an exchange rate
policy instrument in the form of its holdings of foreign exchange, R∗.
2 . 4 P r i c eL e v e la n dt h eR e a lS e c t o r
The cost of living, P, is a geometric weighted average of the price of the
domestic good, PD, and the price of the imported good, EP∗
M (where P∗
M is
the foreign-currency price of the imported good, assumed exogenous):
P = P
1−δ
D (E · P
∗
M)
δ, (23)
12where δ ∈ (0,1) is the share of spending by domestic households on imported
goods, derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function (so that expenditure
shares are constant). Setting P∗
M =1 , this equation becomes
P = PDz
δ, (24)
where z = E/PD is the real exchange rate.
Real consumption expenditure by households, C,m e a s u r e di nu n i t so f
the domestic good, is assumed to depend on the resources available to them
in the form of human as well as physical capital and ﬁnancial wealth, and on
intertemporal relative prices. Because our model is not explicitly intertem-
poral, we capture the contribution of human and physical capital by allowing
consumption to depend positively on disposable income and on the real value
of ﬁnancial wealth. To capture the eﬀects of intertemporal relative prices we
allow it to depend negatively on real rates of return on the assets held by
households (domestic- and foreign-currency deposits, and land). We treat
the partial eﬀects of each of these rates of return on present consumption as
being identical. Thus, consumption spending can be written as:
C = C0+α1(¯ Y −T)−α2[(iD−π
a)+(i
∗+ε−π
a)+(ˆ q−π
a)]+α3(A
H/PD), (25)
where T denotes lump-sum taxes, πa is the expected inﬂation rate, α1 ∈
(0,1) is the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income, and
α2,α 3 > 0.
We model investment demand in a simple fashion. On the assumption
that domestic investment is ﬁnanced by bank loans, the real loan interest rate
represents the opportunity cost of physical capital. Thus the capital stock
desired by ﬁrms, Kd, is inversely related to the real lending rate, iL − πa.
Adjustment costs in changing the physical capital stock cause real investment
spending by domestic ﬁrms I to be a linear function of the diﬀerence between
the desired stock and the actual stock, K0:
I = K
d(iL − π
a) − K0 = I(iL − π
a;K0), (26)
where I1 < 0. Thus, with the beginning-of-period stock of loans given by
LF
0 , new loan demand from commercial banks is equal to
L
F = L
F
0 + PDI. (27)
As noted earlier, as long as ﬁrms are willing to pay the interest rate deﬁned
in (15), the supply of credit is perfectly elastic. Thus, the actual stock of
credit is demand-determined and ﬁrms do not face credit constraints.
13Letting X(z) denote exports, which are positively related to the real
exchange rate (so that X0 > 0), the supply of domestic goods to the domestic
market is ¯ Y − X(z). The equilibrium condition of the market for domestic
g o o d si sg i v e nb y :
¯ Y − X(z)=( 1− δ)C + I + G, (28)
where G is government spending on domestic goods, taken to be exogenous.
2.5 Balance of Payments
Assume for now that oﬃcial foreign reserves are constant at R∗
0 =0 .W e
close the model by specifying the economy’s balance-of-payments equilibrium
condition as:
E
−1PD[X(z) − δC]+i
∗D
∗
0 − (D
∗ − D
∗
0)=0 ,
where D∗
0 is the beginning-of-period stock of household deposits held abroad.
Given that E/PD = z,t h i sc o n d i t i o nb e c o m e s
z
−1[X(z) − δC]+i
∗D
∗
0 − ∆D
∗ =0 . (29)
3M o d e l S o l u t i o n
In solving the model, and as in our previous paper, we will take the expected
rate of change in land prices, the expected rate of inﬂation, and the expected
rate of depreciation all to be exogenous. There are three key endogenous
variables in the model: the banks’ lending rate, iL, the price of domestic
goods, PD, and the real exchange rate, z. To solve it we will express the
domestic goods market clearing condition (28) and the balance-of-payments
equilibrium condition (29) as functions of these three variables, and then use
equation (17) to eliminate the lending rate from these equations. The model
thus collapses to two equations–an internal balance condition describing
equilibrium in the domestic goods market, and an external balance condition
describing balance-of-payments equilibrium–which can be solved for the two
unknowns, z and PD.
Consider ﬁrst the internal balance condition. Substituting the consump-
tion function (25) and the investment function (26) in equation (28), and
14setting C0 =0 , the goods market equilibrium condition can be written as
the requirement that the excess demand for domestic goods be equal to zero:
(1 − δ)
©
α1(¯ Y − T) − α2[(iD − π
a)+( i
∗ + ε − π
a)+(ˆ q − π
a)]
+ α3(A
H/PD)
ª
+ I(iL − π
a;K0)+G + X(z) − ¯ Y =0 .
Using equations (2), (9), (12), (14), and (15), this condition becomes:
(1−δ)
©
α1(¯ Y − T) − α2[((1 + iR)(1 − μ) − 1 − π
a)+( i
∗ + ε − π
a)+(ˆ q − π
a)]
+( α3/PD)[A
H
0 + Q(iD,i
∗ + ε, ˆ q,Y,zPD;A
H
0 ) − Q0 +( zPD − E0)D
∗
0
ª
+I
½
[1 + θL(
κPDK0
LF
0
;xP)][1 + θB(
BB
Bmax)](1 + iR) − 1 − π
a;K0
¾
+G + X(z) − ¯ Y =0 .
This equation expresses the internal balance condition as a function of
the endogenous variables z and PD. Notice that the eﬀect of a change in the
real exchange rate, z, on the excess demand for domestic goods is given by
α3(1 − δ)(Q5 + D
∗
0)+X
0 > 0.
This expression consists of two parts: a wealth eﬀect on consumption of
domestic goods, given by α3(1 − δ)(Q5 + D∗
0), and a competitiveness eﬀect,
given by X0.T h e w e a l t h e ﬀect arises from the fact that, given the price
of domestic goods, a real exchange rate depreciation is the equivalent of a
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate. This nominal depreciation both
creates a capital gain on foreign-currency deposits and results in an increase
in the price of land (see equation 7)). The total eﬀect on household wealth
is given by Q5 + D∗
0, and the resulting increase in consumption demand
for domestic goods is α3(1 − δ)(Q5 + D∗
0). As indicated earlier, the sum
of the wealth and competitiveness eﬀects is positive: a real exchange rate
depreciation, holding the price of domestic goods constant, is expansionary.
The eﬀect of an increase in the price of domestic goods on the excess
demand for such goods, holding the real exchange rate constant, is somewhat
more complicated. It is given by:
α3(1 − δ)
PD
[(Q5 + D
∗
0)z − (
AH
0
PD
)] + I1θL1(
κK0
LF
0
)(1 + θB)(1 + iR).
15The ﬁrst term in this expression is negative: it captures the wealth eﬀects
on consumption of an increase in the price of domestic goods, holding the
real exchange rate constant. When the price of domestic goods rises at
an unchanged value of the real exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate
must depreciate in the exact same proportion as the increase in the price
of domestic goods. As we have just seen, this gives rise to a capital gain
on foreign deposits and land. On the assumption that households initially
hold their desired foreign-currency deposits-land ratio, the increase in the
price of land is proportional to the exchange rate depreciation. This implies
that the real value of land and foreign-currency deposits remains unchanged.
Thus, the net eﬀect on the real value of household ﬁnancial wealth, given
by [(Q5 +D∗
0)z −AH
0 /PD]/PD, is determined by the eﬀects of the price level
increase on total real money balances, which are negative.7
The second term is the “ﬁnancial accelerator” eﬀect. Recalling that I1 < 0
and θL1 < 0, this term is positive: an increase in the domestic price level
increases the collateralizable net worth of domestic ﬁrms, thus lowering their
external ﬁnance premium, reducing banks’ lending rate, and increasing in-
vestment. This, in turn, raises the excess demand for domestic goods. We
w i l la s s u m ef o rn o wt h a tt h er o l eo ft h i se ﬀe c ti st oa m e l i o r a t e ,b u tn o tr e -
verse, the negative eﬀects on the excess demand for domestic goods of an
increase in the price of such goods that operate through wealth eﬀects. In
what follows, however, we will highlight how the properties of the model are
aﬀected by this ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect.
Putting together the eﬀects on the excess demand for domestic goods of
changes in the real exchange rate and of the price of domestic goods, we can
derive an internal balance locus drawn in z-PD space. On the assumption
just made that wealth eﬀects on consumption dominate ﬁnancial accelerator
eﬀects on investment, the internal balance locus must have a positive slope,
as in the curve labeled IB in Figure 1: the positive eﬀects on the excess
demand for domestic goods arising from a real depreciation must be oﬀset
by negative eﬀects arising from an increase in the domestic price level. The
slope of IB is given by
dz
dPD
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
IB
= −
α3(1 − δ)[(Q5 + D∗
0)z − AH
0 /PD]/PD + I1θL1(1 + θB)(1 + iR)
α3(1 − δ)(Q5 + D∗
0)+X0 > 0.
7To see this, recall that if h = E0D∗
0/Q0, Q5 = D∗
0/h = Q0/E0. Substituting in the
ﬁrst term above yields (Q5+D∗
0)z−AH
0 /PD =( Q0+ED∗
0−AH
0 )/PD = −(BILL+D)/PD.
16Notice that, because ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects weaken the eﬀects of
increases in PD on the excess demand for domestic goods, these eﬀects make
the internal balance locus ﬂatter than it would otherwise be–that is, a larger
increase in the domestic price level is required to restore internal balance after
a real depreciation than would be required if ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects were
absent.
Next, consider the external balance condition. Substituting the consump-
tion function (25) and capital ﬂows equation (7) into the balance-of-payments
equilibrium condition (29), the external balance condition can be written as:
z
−1[X(z) − δ{α1(¯ Y − T) − α2[(iD − π
a)+( i
∗ + ε − π
a)+(ˆ q − π
a)]
+α3(A
H/PD)}]+i
∗D
∗
0 − λ[h(i
∗ + ε, ˆ q)Q/E − D
∗
0]=0 .
Substituting for the deposit interest rate from (12), for household ﬁnancial
wealth from (2), and for the price of land from (9), and replacing the nominal
exchange rate E by zPD, the external balance condition becomes:
z
−1{X(z)−δ[α1(¯ Y −T)−α2[{(1+iR)(1−μ)−1−π}+(i
∗+ε−π
a)+(ˆ q−π
a)]
+
α3
PD
[A
H
0 +(Q((1+iR)(1−μ)−1,i
∗+ε, ˆ q,Y,zPD;A
H
0 )−Q0)+(zPD−E0)D
∗
0]}
+i
∗D
∗
0 −λ[
h(i∗ + ε, ˆ q)
zPD
Q{(1+iR)(1−μ)−1,i
∗+ε, ˆ q,Y,zPD;A
H
0 }−D
∗
0]=0 .
Again, this condition can de described as an equation in the two endoge-
nous variables z and PD.
To derive the external balance locus, consider ﬁrst the eﬀects of a real
exchange rate depreciation on the country’s external balance. This eﬀect is
given by:
z
−1(X
0 −
TB
z
) − z
−1δα3(Q5 + D
∗
0) − (
λh
z2PD
)(Q5zPD − Q), (30)
where TB = X − δC is the initial trade balance. This expression can be
decomposed into three parts, corresponding to the three terms above. The
ﬁrst term captures the conventional Marshall-Lerner expenditure-switching
eﬀect. This term will be positive unless the country runs a large initial trade
surplus (TB > zX0) and the elasticity of substitution in demand for the
country’s exports is relatively small. We assume the conventional positive
sign here.
17The second term captures an expenditure-increasing eﬀect arising from
the wealth eﬀects created by depreciation-induced capital gains on foreign-
currency deposits and land. The negative sign on this term arises because
the increase in spending induced by these capital gains results in an increase
in imports, and thus causes the trade balance to deteriorate.
The third term arises from the eﬀect of exchange rate depreciation on
capital outﬂows. A depreciation of the nominal exchange rate simultane-
ously increases households’ demand and supply of foreign-currency deposits.
The latter eﬀect arises because an exchange rate depreciation increases the
domestic-currency value of deposits held abroad proportionately. The former
arises because the increase in the domestic-currency value of foreign-currency
deposits increases the price of land, which in turn raises the demand for
foreign-currency deposits. However, if households initially hold their desired
composition of land and foreign-currency deposits, as we have been assuming
(that is, if E0D∗
0/Q0 = h), then it is easy to show that these eﬀects exactly
oﬀset each other, so Q5zPD − Q =0and the third term vanishes. In what
follows we will consider the reference case to be one in which expenditure-
switching eﬀects are dominant, giving the expression in (30) a positive sign.
However, as before, we will consider the implications of this condition failing
to hold for the experiments to be conducted later.
Finally, consider the eﬀe c t so nt h eb a l a n c eo fp a y m e n t so fa ni n c r e a s ei n
the price of domestic goods, PD. The total eﬀect is given by:
−
δα3
zPD
[(Q5 + D
∗
0)z −
AH
0
PD
] − (
λh
zP2
D
)(Q5zPD − Q).
The ﬁrst term captures the expenditure-reducing eﬀects of an increase in
the price of domestic goods, operating through a negative real balance eﬀect,
on the country’s trade balance. This eﬀect is the same as that described
in the derivation of the IB curve. In this case, the reduction in domestic
consumption implies a reduced demand for imports and thus an improvement
in the balance of payments, giving the ﬁrst term a positive sign.
The second term is similar to that discussed immediately above in de-
riving the eﬀects of a real exchange rate depreciation. It vanishes under the
maintained assumption that E0D∗
0/Q0 = h. The upshot is that an increase in
the price of domestic goods, at a given value of the real exchange rate, must
improve the balance of payments, essentially because of adverse real-balance
eﬀects on the demand for imports.
18Putting together the eﬀects on the external balance condition of changes
in z and PD, it follows that an increase in the price of domestic goods must be
oﬀset by an appreciation in the real exchange rate for the balance of payments
to remain in equilibrium. That is, the external balance locus, labeled EB in
Figure 1, must have a negative slope. This slope is given by:
dz
dPD
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
EB
=
δα3[(Q5 + D∗
0)z − AH
0 /PD]/PD
(X0 − TB/z) − δα3(Q5 + D∗
0)
< 0.
Putting together the internal and external balance loci, as in Figure 1,
t h em o d e lc a nb es o l v e df o rt h ee q u i l i b r i u mv a l u e so ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e
and the price of domestic goods. To understand how the model works, the
next section analyzes the eﬀects on this equilibrium of a variety of policy and
exogenous shocks.
4 Policy and Exogenous Shocks
In this section we undertake several experiments designed to illustrate the
functioning of our framework. The ﬁrst set of experiments involves changes in
monetary policy variables and variables describing structural characteristics
of the domestic ﬁnancial system. These include an increase in the oﬃcial
reﬁnance rate, iR; a central bank auction of government bonds that results
in a change in BB; an increase in the required reserve ratio, μ; an exogenous
increase in the risk premium on bank lending, xP;a ni n c r e a s ei nc o n t r a c t
enforcement costs, κ. Our second set of experiments involves exogenous
shocks in the form of changes in public spending G, and in the world interest
rate i∗.
4.1 Changes in the Reﬁnance Rate
As indicated earlier, changes in the reﬁnance rate are intermediated through
the banking system to the bond rate as well as to the loan interest rate.
Because it is passed on directly by banks to the deposit rate, an increase in
the reﬁnance rate exerts both interest rate and wealth eﬀects on consumption.
An increase in the deposit interest rate directly induces consumers to
increase saving and thus reduce spending on domestic goods. It also induces
them to switch away from nonmonetary assets–including land–and into
deposits, thereby depressing land prices. The lower price of land represents
19a reduction in household wealth, which reinforces the adverse eﬀect of higher
deposit rates on private consumption. In addition, the higher reﬁnance rate
i sp a s s e do nb yb a n k st ot h el o a nr a t e( g i v e nt h eﬁxed markup on government
bonds), which reduces investment by domestic ﬁrms. The upshot is that to
maintain internal balance at an unchanged value of PD, the real exchange
rate rate would have to depreciate. Thus the IB curve shifts upward, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
An increase in the reﬁnance rate has three eﬀects on the external balance
condition. First, through its eﬀect on the deposit rate, it directly reduces
consumption spending, thus lowering the demand for imports and improving
the trade balance. Second, by exerting downward pressure on the price of
land, it reduces household wealth, with negative indirect eﬀects on consump-
tion; these eﬀects, as we have just seen, reinforce the direct eﬀect. These
two eﬀects together cause an increase in the reﬁnance rate to improve the
trade balance, for given values of z and PD. At the same time, the reduc-
tion in the price of land caused by the increase in the reﬁnance rate reduces
household demand for foreign-currency deposits, so households are led to
repatriate capital. The resulting capital inﬂow reinforces the positive eﬀects
of the increase in the reﬁnance rate on the trade balance, with the result that
the three channels all combine to improve the balance of payments. Conse-
quently, to restore external balance, the real exchange rate has to appreciate,
that is, the EB curve shifts down. The upshot is that the price of the domes-
tic good must fall–the increase in the reﬁnance rate is contractionary–but
the eﬀect of this policy on the real exchange rate is ambiguous. As shown in
Figure 2, depending on the magnitude of the shift in the IB curve relative
to the EB curve, the economy may move from the initial position E to a
point such as E0 (corresponding to a depreciation) or E00 (corresponding to
an appreciation).8
Because the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is to ﬂatten out
the IB curve, it is easy to show that the stronger the ﬁnancial accelerator
eﬀect is, the more powerful will be the contractionary eﬀect of the increase
in the reﬁnance rate on the domestic economy–that is, the larger the drop
in the price of the domestic good. A stronger ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect,
everything else equal, also makes it more likely that the real exchange rate
8A similar graph could be drawn to show that whether the real exchange rate appreci-
ates or depreciates depends on the magnitude of the shift in the EB curve relative to the
IB curve.
20will depreciate in response to an increase in the reﬁnance rate.
4.2 Central Bank Auctions
Another common monetary policy tool used by central banks in industrial
and middle-income developing countries alike is the auctioning of government
bonds to commercial banks. Such an auction increases the stock of govern-
ment bonds BB that must be held by these banks. Because this measure has
no eﬀect on bank deposit rates, it does not aﬀect the rates of return faced
by domestic households on the assets they hold in their portfolios. Con-
sequently, there is no incentive for households to reallocate assets, and no
impact eﬀect on household demand for land. The implication is that, unlike
in the case of a change in the reﬁnance rate, land prices are not a vehicle for
monetary transmission in the case of central bank auctions.
However, the additional bonds held by commercial banks increase the risk
associated with this asset from the banks’ perspective, because the govern-
ment’s debt-servicing capacity (as measured by Bmax) remains unchanged.
Consequently, banks increase the premium θB that they demand for holding
government bonds. Because the loan interest rate is determined as a markup
over the interest rate on government bonds, the lending rate demanded by
banks in order to continue to hold the amount of loans outstanding increases
as well. Because this reduces the investment demand for domestic goods, the
IB curve shifts upward, as shown in Figure 3. However, on our maintained
assumption that investment demand is wholly devoted to the purchase of
domestic goods, this shock has no eﬀect on the external balance locus. The
domestic price level must fall–making this a contractionary shock–and the
real exchange rate must depreciate. It is easy to show that a stronger ﬁnan-
cial accelerator eﬀect will tend to magnify both of these results.
4.3 Increase in the Reserve Requirement Rate
An increase in the required reserve ratio, μ, makes deposits less attractive to
banks as a source of funding and causes them to lower the deposit interest
rate. This aﬀe c t st h eg o o d sm a r k e tb o t hd i r e c t l y ,b e c a u s et h el o w e rd e p o s i t
rate discourages saving and stimulates consumption, as well as indirectly, as
the lower deposit rate causes household to reallocate their portfolios away
from deposits and into real assets such as land. The result is that land
prices rise and household consumption is stimulated through a wealth eﬀect.
21Because both eﬀects tend to increase demand for domestic goods, a more
appreciated real exchange rate is required to clear the goods market. Unlike
in the case of a change in the reﬁnance rate, this policy has no eﬀect on the
loan rate or investment spending, because under the monetary policy regime
under consideration, it does not change commercial banks’ marginal cost
of funds. The positive eﬀects on consumption cause the IB curve to shift
downward (see Figure 4). Because changes in the required reserve ratio aﬀect
the external balance condition only through the term (1+iR)(1−μ)−1,t h e
eﬀects of an increase in that ratio on the EB curve are exactly the opposite
of those of an increase in the reﬁnance rate considered above: the external
balance locus shifts upward. The net result is that the price of domestic
goods increases, but eﬀects on the real exchange rate are ambiguous, with
possibly a real appreciation in the new equilibrium (a move from point E
to point E00)i ft h es h i f ti nEB is large enough. In short, increases in the
required reserve ratio are expansionary.
The explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that, as pre-
viously mentioned, changes in reserve requirements have no eﬀect on banks’
cost of funds under our assumed monetary policy regime. Because the central
bank stands ready to provide the funds desired by banks at the given policy
rate iR, increases in reserve requirements leave banks’ cost of funds–and
therefore their lending rates–unaﬀected, while at the same time lowering
the interest rate that represents the opportunity cost both of current versus
future consumption, as well as of holding real assets as opposed to ﬁnancial
ones. The induced substitution of current for future consumption and the
higher level of consumption induced by capital gains on real assets are the
mechanisms through which expansionary eﬀects are transmitted to the real
economy.
4.4 Shifts in the Risk Premium
and Contract Enforcement Costs
An increase in banks’ perceived risk of lending to private ﬁrms, as captured
by an upward shift in the parameter xP, induces banks to demand a higher
risk premium. Just as in the case of central bank auctions, this would in-
crease banks’ lending rate, cause domestic investment to contract, and shift
the IB curve upward. Again, the macroeconomic results are as depicted in
Figure 3: the real exchange rate depreciates, and the price of domestic goods
22falls. The presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator once again magniﬁes these ef-
fects: the increase in the loan interest rate is larger than that required to
oﬀset the initial shift in perceived risk, because the rise in the real value
of loans outstanding lowers the collateral oﬀered by ﬁrms, increasing banks’
intermediation costs.
An increase in κ, resulting from a reduction in contract enforcement costs,
raises the proportion of ﬁrms’ real assets that can be pledged as collateral. In
turn, the improved quality of collateral reduces banks’ intermediation costs
a n da l l o w st h e mt oc h a r g eal o w e rp r e m i u m .T h u st h em a r k u po nl e n d i n gt o
ﬁrms, θL, is reduced, and the IB curve shifts downward, as in Figure 5. This
is clearly expansionary, as the domestic price level rises and the real exchange
rate appreciates. Notice that in this case the ﬁnancial accelerator magniﬁes
the reduction in the loan rate, because the increase in the domestic price level
reduces the real value of ﬁrms’ loans, and thus increases the eﬀective value
of their collateral over and above what is achieved through the reduction in
contract enforcement costs per se.
4.5 Changes in Public Expenditure
and World Interest Rates
An increase in government spending on domestic goods shifts the IB curve
downward while leaving the EB curve unchanged, increasing the domestic
price level and causing the real exchange rate to appreciate. It is straightfor-
ward to show that, contrary to what standard “crowding out” considerations
might suggest, the loan interest rate would actually fall in this case. The
reason is that the central bank follows an accommodative monetary policy
under our assumptions, keeping the reﬁnance rate iR ﬁxed and rediscounting
freely to meet banks’ demands for funds. Thus, the supply of funds to banks
is perfectly elastic, and in the absence of ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects the loan
interest rate would remain unchanged. The eﬀect on the loan rate thus arises
purely from the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀe c t ,w h i c hi nt h i sc a s ea c t st or e d u c e
the loan rate because the higher domestic price level reduces the real value
of ﬁrms’ outstanding debt to banks.
Changes in world interest rates have more complicated eﬀects. An in-
crease in i∗, for instance, has no direct eﬀect on commercial banks or the
government, because neither ﬁnancial intermediaries nor the government are
assumed to borrow or lend abroad. Households, however, do have access to
23foreign assets in the form of deposits, and the higher foreign deposit rate
induces them to shift their portfolios out of domestic and into foreign assets.
This implies a reduced demand for land, with a concomitant fall in its price.
Together with a direct negative eﬀect on consumption spending arising from
the substitution of future for present consumption, the result is that the de-
mand for domestic goods contracts, causing the IB curve to shift upward.
The shift in the external balance locus, however, is ambiguous. The reduc-
tion in domestic absorption caused by the eﬀects just described, together with
an increase in interest earnings on (beginning-of-period) foreign-currency de-
posits, cause the current account to improve. However, the increased returns
available on foreign-currency deposits induce a capital outﬂow, leaving the
overall eﬀect on the balance of payments ambiguous. If impediments to cap-
ital outﬂows (as measured by λ)a r es u ﬃciently strong, such inﬂows will be
muted and the net eﬀect on the balance of payments will be positive, causing
the EB curve to shift downward. In this case the eﬀect on the domestic
economy must be contractionary (the price of the domestic good must fall),
but eﬀects on the real exchange rate are ambiguous, as illustrated in Figure
6( m o v ef r o mE to either E0 or E00).
However, if capital outﬂows are suﬃciently large, this result could be
reversed. Indeed, if these outﬂows are strong enough to cause the increase
in the world interest rate to induce an incipient deﬁcit in the balance of
payments, the EB curve would shift upward. If so, the real exchange rate
always depreciates; and if the shift in EB is suﬃciently large, the shock could
be expansionary (move from E to E0000, as opposed to E000,i nF i g u r e6 ) .T h e
expansion would be driven in this case by a depreciation of the real exchange
rate that improves the competitiveness of domestic producers and creates
positive wealth eﬀects on consumption.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Building on a previous contribution (Agénor and Montiel (2006)), we devel-
oped in this paper a simple open-economy macroeconomic model with credit
market imperfections, ﬂexible prices, and a ﬂoating exchange rate. A key as-
sumption of the model is that banks must incur a cost to monitor the activity
of borrowers, as a result of information asymmetries. Thus, lenders must be
compensated in the form of a premium, above and beyond their “normal”
proﬁt margin and the cost of borrowing from the central bank. The premium,
24in turn, depends on borrowers’ net worth, which gives rise to the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator. In contrast to models in the Kiyotaki-Moore tradition, the supply
of bank loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing rate and there is no ex-
plicit credit rationing. The central bank sets the reﬁnance rate and provides
banks with unlimited access to liquidity at that rate. The model was used
to study the macroeconomic eﬀects of changes in the reﬁnance and reserve
requirement rates, central bank auctions, shifts in the premium and contract
enforcement costs, and changes in public spending and world interest rates.
As argued by Krugman (1999), the type of simple, relatively ad hoc model
that we develop here can actually be a powerful tool for clarifying thought,
given its inherent general equilibrium nature. More rigorous, micro-based
models may not be demonstrably better from that perspective, particularly
when it comes to discussing real-world policy issues.
Nevertheless, the model presented in this paper could be fruitfully ex-
tended in a number of directions. In the framework described above, ﬁrms
borrow only from domestic banks. While this is appropriate for many lower
middle-income countries, we could also account for foreign borrowing by
ﬁrms, as for instance in Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003), Céspedes,
Chang, and Velasco (2003, 2004), Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006),
and Tovar (2005, 2006). By endogenizing the foreign interest rate through a
mark-up equation similar to the one used earlier, one could examine the net
worth eﬀects associated with changes in the domestic-currency value of for-
eign debt, in the presence of currency mismatches. A nominal depreciation,
in this context, could trigger a vicious cycle: by increasing the domestic-
currency value of foreign liabilities, it may lead to a deterioration in borrow-
ers’ net worth. The resulting increase in the premium on foreign borrowing,
by raising the domestic cost of borrowing, may in turn exacerbate ﬂuctua-
tions in investment, activity, and capital ﬂows. Most of the existing models
in this area, however, abstract from domestic banks and focus exclusively on
external ﬁnancial intermediation. An important direction for future research
would be therefore to consider the case where domestic ﬁrms have access to
both types of ﬁnancing.
Alternatively, it could be assumed that ﬁrms borrow directly only from
domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, with these intermediaries in turn borrow-
ing at a premium on world capital markets, as for instance in Agénor and
Aizenman (1998). Although there is evidence suggesting that ﬁnancial accel-
erator eﬀects operating through a foreign ﬁnance premium may be signiﬁcant
25for some countries,9 this two-level ﬁnancial structure may actually provide
a better characterization of borrowing opportunities for some middle-income
developing countries, where direct access to international capital markets is
typically available to only a small group of large ﬁrms.
Some of the other extensions identiﬁed in Agénor and Montiel (2006) are
also relevant here, of course. For instance, one could endogenize the supply
side and introduce a cost channel for monetary policy, by accounting for a
direct eﬀect of lending rates on ﬁrms’ marginal production costs. This is a
common feature of developing economies (as discussed in Agénor (2006) and
Cheng and Ma (2005)), and there is some evidence that this eﬀect may be im-
portant also in industrial countries.10 By contrast, New Keynesian models of
monetary policy either disregard this channel (as in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(1999)) or, when they do account for it, continue to assume that the cen-
tral bank controls the growth rate of money (as in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005)). A possible starting point could be the closed-economy,
staggered-price framework proposed by Bruckner and Schabert (2003), whose
ﬁnancial component would need to be thoroughly reworked.
Equally important is the need to extend the model to a dynamic setting,
with an explicit account of ﬁnancial asset and physical capital accumulation.
This would allow not only to endogenize price and exchange rate expectations
(with possibly both forward- and backward-looking components) but also to
consider the possibility that banks may price diﬀerently short-term loans
aimed at ﬁnancing working capital needs (as in the “cost channel” literature
alluded to earlier), and longer-term investment loans. As suggested by the
results in Das (2004), the real eﬀects of monetary policy could then be quite
diﬀerent, depending on the factors that aﬀect these pricing decisions.
9See, for instance, Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006) for the case of Korea,
and Tovar (2006) for Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
10Among recent studies, see for instance Ravenna and Walsh (2006) for the United
States, Gaiotti and Secchi (2006) for Italy, Kato (2006) for Japan, and Chowdhury, Hoﬀ-
mann, and Schabert (2006) for a larger group of countries. Cooley and Quadrini (2006)
present also some useful simulation results.
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